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I.

Introduction

A seventy-two- year-old woman in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma is willing to
cut prescription pills in half or not take them at all, in order to stretch her dollar and
prolong the amount of time she can spend with these precious little commodities.1 If
dissection of pills does not prolong her supply sufficiently, she is willing to travel to a
foreign country to buy cheaper pills.2 Another elderly person reflected on her choice to
access the legal goods in a potentially illegal way by stating: “Life is sure more
comfortable if you don’t hurt so bad.”3 Pharmaceuticals are not only a desired good on
an open market, but they are vital for the very survival of many individuals in the United
States. However, the pharmaceutical companies’ level of profit and success is directly
correlated with the physical suffering and economic hardship experienced by most
Americans who depend on pharmaceuticals for survival.
In 2002, nearly 15% of the Gross Domestic Product in the United States was
spent on health care, which translates to approximately $5,440 for every citizen. 4 In fact,
the Journal of Health Affairs reported that spending on health care in 2002 grew more
than any other industry in the United States.5 Congress has stated: “[d]espite increases in
medical care spending that are greater than the rate of inflation, population growth, and
Gross Domestic Product growth, there has not been a commensurate improvement in our
health status as a nation.”6
As a subspecies of the health care industry, pharmaceutical companies enjoy the
largest profit margin of any industry in the United States.7 The pharmaceutical industry
has finally been able to surface from the quagmire of market restraint in order to meet
society’s insatiable appetite for health. Or is the pharmaceutical industries’ experience in
the United States an anomaly?

1

Brian Barber, RxDepot Hearing Ends, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 10, 2003, at A1.
Id.
3
Id.
4
Sara Schaefer Munoz, U.S. Health Care Spending Rose 9.3% in 2002, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2004, at A2.
5
Id.
6
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1014,
42 U.S.C. § 299(a)(3) (2003) [hereinafter Act of 2003].
7
Shawna Lydon Woodward, Note, Will Price Control Legislation Satisfactorily Address the Issue of High
Prescription Drug Prices?: Several States Are Waiting in the Balance for PhRMA v. Concannon, 26
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 169, 174-175 (2002).
2
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Despite the pharmaceutical companies’ profiteering triumph in the United States,
the triumph is not necessarily representative of pharmaceutical companies’ success the
world round.8 Arguably, the pharmaceutical companies do not operate under the harness
of typical market restraints.9 Distinguishing the United States further from the rest of the
worlds, the brunt of the significant profit margin enjoyed by the pharmaceutical industry
is borne directly by the consumer and not the government.10 These costs are paid in the
form of increased premiums for insurance and private pharmaceutical drug plans, or
through increased tax monies that fund social legislation designed to provide prescription
drug coverage for various impoverished sectors of American society. In 2003, employer
sponsored health care plans rose in cost an average of 10% per employee, forcing
employers to pass the increased costs onto their employees. Meanwhile, 19% fewer
employers provide health care coverage to senior citizen retirees than just ten years ago.11
The search to find mechanisms to reduce the cost of pharmaceutical drugs is
reaching a head, if the debate has not done so already. Various state legislatures have
enacted mandatory rebate and prior authorization measures to deter physicians from
prescribing high priced brand name pharmaceuticals to Medicaid recipients without a
medically necessary reason as to why a cheaper generic solution could not be
implemented.12 For example, the state of Maine has not only threatened disclosure of the
names of companies who refuse to participate in the program, but Maine has also
increased the number of beneficiaries under the Maine Prescription statute to include a
non-Medicare, non-Medicaid population of under or uninsured.13 The beneficiaries under
Maine’s prescription drug plan now includes a suffering group of individuals whose
personal insurance or pharmaceutical drug plans fail to adequately cover their
8

Woodward, supra note 7, at 174. Although the pharmaceutical industry is one of the most profitable in
the world, Americans pay more for their drugs than any other country in the world. Id.
9
Michael B. Moore, “Open Wide” (Your Pocketbook That Is!)- A Call For the Establishment in the United
States of a Prescription Drug Price Regulatory Agency, 1 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 149, 154-155 (Fall
1994).
10
See, e.g., Act of 2003, supra note 3.
11
Vaness Fuhrmans, Shifting Burden Helps Employers Cut Health Costs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2003, at B1.
12
Martha Ann Holt, International Prescription Drug Cost Containment Strategies and Suggestions For
Reform in the United States, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 325, 340-42 (Spring 2003). Those state
legislatures include: Maine, Wisconsin, and Michigan. See generally PhRMA v. Walsh, 123 S.Ct. 1855
(2003)(discussing Maine legislation); PhRMA v. Meadows, 304 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2002)(discussing
Florida legislation).
13
22 M.R.S.A. § 2681 (2002). As compared to other states with similar statutes. See, e.g. Marth Ann Holt,
supra note 12, at 340-42.
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prescription expenses and who do not qualify as traditional Medicaid recipients.14 The
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Maine Prescription statute, holding that
the program did not place a disparate burden on interstate commerce and vacated a
preliminary injunction barring the implementation of the state’s statute.15
Likewise, frustrated by the lack of effective regulation of pharmaceutical prices in
the U.S., individuals struggling to make ends meet have traveled, both physically and
electronically, to foreign markets for relief.16 One of the more popular of the foreign
markets is Canada.17 Within many states, officials on both the local and state
governmental levels have, not only provided incentives for state and local employees to
purchase drugs from Canadian pharmacies instead of American pharmacies,18 but have
also set up websites for the benefit of all citizens of a given state.19 Although the private
industry has attempted to facilitate international access to those who cannot physically
travel, private industry facilitation of international access to pharmaceuticals has met
some level of defeat.20 The United States Congress has circumnavigated the individual
states’ ability to regulate the public welfare of their citizens by granting sole legislative
discretion on the issue to the Secretary of Health and Human Services; a member of the
executive branch.21
Parts II, III, and IV of this article examine the arguments surrounding possible
free market price control mechanisms, in light of the pharmaceutical importation cases

14

See 22 M.R.S.A. § 2681, supra note 13. “ ‘Qualified resident’ also means a resident of the State whose
family incurs unreimbursed expenses for prescription drugs that equal 5% or more of family income or
whose total unreimbursed medical expenses equal 15% or more of family income.”
15
Walsh, 123 S.Ct. at 1873 (2003).
16
Anne Wilde Mathews, States to Help Citizens Import Canadian Drugs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2003, at
B1.
17
Id.
18
Boston to Force Issue on Canadian Drugs, WALL ST. J., December 10, 2003, page unavailable.
19
Mathews, supra note 16, at B1.
20
United States v. RxDepot, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1247 (2003). But see 21 U.S.C § 384 (2003) (allowing
Secretary of Health and Human Services the capacity to approve re-importers of pharmaceuticals). See
also FDA Warns CanaRx Services About Its Illegal Internet Website & Mail Operation Obtaining
Unapproved & Potentially Risky Drugs From Canada, 13 BIOMEDICAL MKT. NEWSL. 14, Oct. 31, 2003
[hereinafter FDA Warns].
21
Act of 2003, supra note 3. In fact, Congress wishes to grant the ability of the Secretary to “provide
legally binding advisory opinions on appropriate interpretation and application of regulations to carry out
the medicare program…”; which would allow the executive the exclusive ability to decide on behalf of the
aging American people what is in their best interest in procuring and accessing not only pharmaceutical
drugs, but also the extent of health care coverage Medicare would practically have. Id. See also 42
U.S.C.A. § 1395hh NOTE (2003).
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and state Medicaid initiatives both on the state level in the United States and elsewhere.
Part V examines the provisions in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003 (the “Act”) as they pertain to pharmaceutical importation
possibilities. A workable price control mechanism may be the product of state initiatives
to contain the ever-increasing burden on the under-insured and government dependants
by exercising their bargaining power as public welfare police.

This price control

mechanism must include a certification by the Secretary of Health and Human Services
to Congress that the importation regulations specified in the Act will “result in a
significant reduction in the cost of covered products to the American consumer,” thus
allowing prescription drugs priced at lower foreign prices22 to enter the United States
pharmaceutical market.23 The arguments are being exhausted. The American people still
suffer.24
Price controls may be the only way to combat unchecked profit. If prices and
profit margins continue to rise unchecked, how much money are Americans willing to
hemorrhage? Now may be the last chance. The Secretary of Health and Human Services,
Congress, and state legislatures must embrace current initiatives and perfect their
implementation before high prices prohibit patients from meaningful access to
pharmaceutical technology.

II.

RxDepot and Others.

RxDepot is a Tulsa, Oklahoma company, that until November 6, 2003,25 operated
an online pharmacy through which customers with prescriptions for pharmaceuticals
could purchase their drugs from a Canadian partner pharmacy.26 RxDepot operated
eighty-five locations in twenty-six states.27 Upon submission of the relevant prescription
to the local RxDepot store, customers were asked to fill out various forms concerning

22

These lower prices are the product of foreign price control mechanisms not implemented in the United
States. See infra, Part II.
23
21 U.S.C. § 384 (2004).
24
Act of 2003, supra note 6.
25
See RxDepot, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1247.
26
Brian Barber, Judge Hears RxDepot Case, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 9, 2003, at A1.
27
Id.
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their medical histories.

28

The customer’s prescription, medical history, and payment

information were forwarded to the partner pharmacy in Canada, where a Canadian
medical doctor rewrote the prescription and the order was processed.29
On March 21, 2003 the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) sent a warning
letter to RxDepot stating that the FDA believed that RxDepot was illegally re-importing
manufactured drugs from foreign countries into the United States, as well as importing
unapproved prescription drugs.30 RxDepot issued a response to the FDA letter, stating
that the company was merely importing pharmaceuticals that were manufactured within
the United States.31 Unsatisfied with the response, the FDA continued to send such letters
to RxDepot warning legal action.32
On September 11, 2003, the United States filed a lawsuit against RxDepot
alleging violations of the Federal, Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)33 and sought an
injunction as authorized by the FDCA.34 The government presented, and the court
adopted as fact, evidence of certain undercover FDA investigations which resulted in the
receipt of: 1) an overfill of a prescription; 2) a generic version of a patent protected drug
that was neither available nor manufactured in the U.S.; and 3) a non-FDA approved
warning insert and packaging that failed to mention specific information about the
possible occurrence of liver damage associated with the use of a particular drug.35
Further, some purchases of re-imports were made from companies other than the U.S.
manufacturer of the drug.36 Additionally, the government presented evidence indicating
that the Canadian pharmacy failed to validate the authenticity of certain ordered
prescriptions.37 However, the effectiveness and potency of the drugs were never tested,
and no defect in the composition of the drugs themselves was ever alleged.38
28

RxDepot, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1247.
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
The FDA has also threatened other companies similar to RxDepot, such as CanaRx Services, Inc. of
Detroit, MI through this same letter campaign, citing risks to the public health. Id. See FDA Warns, supra
note 19.
33
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(d)(t), 381(d)(1)(2003).
34
290 F. Supp. 2d at 1239.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Barber, supra note 26.
38
RxDepot, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1243.
29
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In its rebuttal of the results of the FDA investigations that the court adopted as
fact, RxDepot argued three facts. 39 First, RxDepot argued that the allegedly overfilled
prescriptions allowed for a refill amount in excess of the dose actually delivered.40
Second, RxDepot argued that the generic version of the patent protected drug allegedly
not manufactured in the U.S., was actually manufactured in Puerto Rico at an FDA
approved facility.41 Third, RxDepot argued that the alleged omitted liver information was
included in a section of the packaging devoted to potential side effects, and thus not
entirely absent.42
In finding importing drugs harmful to the consumer, the Northern District of
Oklahoma stated that the quality of imported and re-imported drugs is “less predictable
than drugs obtained in the United States” because the integrity of the drugs themselves
may be compromised during their tenure outside the U.S.43 Furthermore, the district court
found that drugs imported in greater amounts than the prescription called for could be
taken for longer periods of time and without the clinical supervision intended by the
prescribing physician.44 Finally, the court found that the failure to include specific FDA
approved packaging endangered the patient.45
After finding that prescription drug costs were significantly higher in the United
States than in other countries, and recognizing Congress as the “best” place to address the
issues of price control on prescription drugs, the district court addressed the
government’s petition to grant a preliminary injunction against RxDepot.46
47

held that RxDepot’s operations constituted a per se violation of the FDCA.

The court
Therefore,

because RxDepot was in violation of the statute, the court held that the government was
substantially likely to prevail against RxDepot in a full adjudication of the factual issues

39

Barber, supra note 26.
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
RxDepot, 290 F. Supp. 2d, at 1240.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 1242. When the injunction is authorized as part of a statutory scheme, the court must only find that
there is a minimal chance of continued violation. Here, the court held that the absence of the injunction
would allow the defendant to continue re-importing drugs. Id.
47
Id. at 1244.
40
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in the case.48 The court stated that RxDepot’s ability to offer lower prices, and whatever
public health benefits were incidental from these lower prices, were best weighed against
the benefits of the FDCA restriction in Congress and not through judicial opinion.49
Additionally, because RxDepot’s actions constituted a per se violation of a congressional
act, injunction could only be avoided if the statute itself was unconstitutional.50
During its examination of the FDCA’s constitutionality, the court held that the
FDA’s selective prosecution of importers of small quantities of prescription drugs was
not selective enforcement barred by the constitution because RxDepot was a commercial
entity operating to provide large quantities of drugs to a significant portion of the
population.51 Moreover, the court stated that because agencies such as the FDA are given
great discretion in the prosecution of violations, selective prosecutions are only
unconstitutional when they are based on arbitrary criteria.52 Since the FDA is limited in
resources, the court reasoned that selective enforcement against large-scale enterprises
was a logical application of the FDA’s efforts to reduce the risk of harm to the consumer
arising from unauthorized re-importation of pharmaceuticals.53

The court dismissed

other constitutional challenges by finding that no entity can assert certain constitutional
objections that arise from invalid, illegal activities.54 Therefore, the court granted a
preliminary injunction against RxDepot for the reasons stated above.55
On November 12, 2003 the Northern District of Oklahoma rejected an emergency
plea to stay the preliminary injunction while the decision was on appeal.56 In upholding
its grant of the preliminary injunction, the court held that lost profits from engaging in an
illegal activity could not constitute the irreparable harm necessary to circumvent
preliminary injunction.57 Additionally, the court reiterated that the government had a

48

Id.
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 1245.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. Specifically, a violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the First Amendment right of
free speech. Id.
55
Id. at 1247.
56
United States v. RxDepot, No. 03-CV-0616-EA, 2003 WL 23120030, at*1 (N.D. Okla. November 12,
2003).
57
Id.
49
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prevailing safety concern in preventing re-importation, which overrode any potential
damage due to the high prices of pharmaceuticals in the United States.58
On November 21, 2003, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to overturn
the injunction.59 In its appellee brief, the FDA argued that “RxDepot is facilitating
violations of the [FDCA] on a massive and highly organized scale…unlike the activities
of individual consumers….”60 On November 23, 2003, frustrated RxDepot attorney Fred
Stoops re-highlighted the ramifications that closing RxDepot storefronts nationwide
would have on the elderly in a letter to the Tulsa World, a newspaper in Tulsa,
Oklahoma:
The FDA admitted that Health Canada has the same or similar standard to
its own and is just as safe. All prescriptions filed through RxDepot came
from a Health Canada pharmacy. . . .For a second time, the greatest
generation is being asked to sacrifice -- but this time not to stop the
onslaught of evil against freedom. This time it is just about money.61
Similarly, the plight of RxDepot repeats on other fronts. The FDA threatened
legal action that may lead to the closure of CanaRx Services, Inc. of Detroit, Michigan.62
In addition to providing cost savings to individuals, CanaRx provides employees of
Springfield, Massachusetts access to reduced prescription drug prices; the first
municipality in the United States to provide such benefits to its employees.63 The FDA
has sent several warning letters to the company.64 The success of the government in
RxDepot65 and the enactment of the Medicare Act of 2003 indicate that this genus of
pharmaceutical importer soon will no longer be able to operate in order to provide cost
savings to the public.

58

Id.
See Robert Boczkiewicz & Brian Barber, Ruling to Keep RxDepot Closed, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 22,
2003, at A15.
60
See Robert Bocziewicz, FDA Counters RxDepot’s Request For Stay, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 21, 2003, at
A21.
61
The Truth of the Matter, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 23, 2003, at G2.
62
See FDA Warns, supra note 20.
63
Prescription Drug Importation; Canadian Drug Supplier Says Products Safe, MED. LETTER ON CDC &
FDA 35, Oct. 19, 2003.
64
Id.
65
RxDepot, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1238.
59
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III.

The Maine Rx Program, the State Initiative, and Others.

In 2000, the state legislature of Maine enacted the Maine Rx Plus Program.66 The
program aims to establish affordable prescription drug access to the residents of Maine
who fall within the state’s Medicaid criteria.67 Additionally, the program provides relief
to those Maine residents who incur either, un-reimbursed expenses for prescription drugs
equal to or greater than 5% of family income or, un-reimbursed medical expenses equal
to or in excess of 15% of family income.68
Under the statute, all manufacturers or labelers of pharmaceuticals that sell their
drugs within the state under publicly funded pharmaceutical drug plans must negotiate
rebates with the state.69 The proceeds from the rebates are then placed into a fund, which
reimburses the participating pharmacies that sell the drugs at a reduced price.70 When the
act takes full effect on October 1, 2004, pharmacies within the state will sell the drugs at
the prices reached through rebate negotiations with the pharmaceutical companies, minus
any further discounts that the rebate fund is able to provide.71 The Maine Board of
Pharmacy must publish the discounted rates in participating pharmacies, indicating the
amount of money saved by the initiative.72
Also, the statute provides that the state shall publish the names of the
manufacturers and labelers who refuse to participate in the rebate arrangement to both the
public and health care providers within the state.73 In addition, physicians who desire to
prescribe drugs manufactured by companies who refuse to enter into a rebate agreement
are subject to prior authorization.74

The prior authroization process requires the

prescribing physician to verify the medical necessity of prescribing the drug of a non-

66

22 M.R.S.A. § 2681 (2003).
Id. at §2681(2)(F).
68
Id.
69
Id. at §2681(3)(4). These rebates must at least be equal to the 15% rebates negotiated by the federal
government under federal law. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 2681(4).
70
22 M.R.S.A. § 2681(3)(4) (2003).
71
Id. at §2681(5).
72
Id. at §2681(6)(A).
73
Id. at §2681(7).
74
Id.
67
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participating entity with a state appointed physician, who may then approve prescription
of the drug.75
Drug company executives have expressed concerns with regard to prior
authorization programs.

76

The concern is that the programs decrease the number of

prescriptions written for drugs produced by those manufacturers who choose not to
participate in the MaineRx program, thus directly affecting profits of those companies.77
Drug companies also fear decreased profit margins, as lower prices are negotiated
through rebate agreements, as well as a decrease in physician and patient loyalty.78
In PhRMA v. Concannon,79 the Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA) brought suit against Maine’s Commissioner of Human Services and
the Attorney General of Maine alleging preemption under the federal Medicaid program,
a violation of the Supremacy Clause, and violations of the dormant Commerce Clause.80
The PhRMA contended that the program imposed a significant burden on Medicaid
recipients by requiring recipients to go through the hassle of prior authorization without
providing any valid Medicaid purpose, and that the statute regulated out of state
commerce.81 The district court upheld both of these contentions and issued a preliminary
injunction against Maine, holding that the state statute conflicted with the purpose of the
federal Medicaid statute, and finding that the Maine Rx Program regulated the revenues
of out of state distributors and manufacturers of pharmaceutical drugs.82
On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of
injunction.83 The circuit court held that because the federal Medicaid statute explicitly
granted states the authority to use prior authorization, no conflict existed between the
Maine and federal statute.84 The court iterated so long as the requirements under the
federal statute were met, the purpose of the state, to provide access to medical services

75

Id; see also Jagan Nicholas Ranjan, Medicaid and the Unconstitutional Dimensions of Prior
Authorization, 101 MICH. L. REV. 602 (2002) (outlining and critiquing the prior authorization process).
76
Walsh, 123 S.Ct. at 1864.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
249 F3d 66 (1st Cir. 2001).
80
Walsh, 123 S.Ct. at 1860.
81
Id.
82
Woodward, supra note 7, at 180.
83
PhRMA v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2001).
84
Walsh, 123 S.Ct. at 1865.
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for those who could not afford them, was congruous with the purpose of the federal
statute.85 Further, the circuit court pointed out that the state might decrease long-term
Medicaid expenditures arising from untreated conditions by providing prescription drug
access to individuals that would not otherwise be able to afford the drugs for the
treatment of deteriorating conditions.86 However, the circuit court recognized that prior
authorization may potentially affect the quality of medical care provided to Medicaid
beneficiaries, thus, the court allowed the PhRMA to reserve the right to challenge
preemption after the implementation of the Maine statute, in the event that prior
authorization negatively affected medical care.87
The First Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the statute did not violate the
dormant commerce clause.88 In so doing, the circuit court stated that, although the profit
margins of pharmaceutical companies and distributors could experience incidental
effects, the statute did not aim to regulate profits itself; nor did the statute regulate the
prices in other states. 89 Rather, the circuit court stated that the statute only negotiated
rebates for the benefit of the citizens of the state of Maine.90 Moreover, the court found
that all transactions policed under the Maine statute occurred within the state of Maine.91
After balancing the local benefits against any burdens on interstate commerce, the circuit
court held that the benefit derived from increased access to pharmaceutical drugs
outweighed the loss of profits suffered by the producers of these drugs.92
The United States Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari and affirmed the First
Circuit Court of Appeal.93 The Court affirmed in a plurality decision.94 In its amicus
brief, the government argued that the prior authorization allowed under the federal
Medicaid statute was intended only to balance access with price, not to lower prescription

85

Id.
Id; see also Concannon, 249 F.3d at 81.
87
Walsh, 123 S.Ct. at 1866.
88
Id.
89
Concannon, 249 F.3d at 82.
90
Id..
91
Id. These transactions included the purchase of the prescription drugs, the negotiation of the rebate, the
prior authorization, and the release of the names of nonparticipating manufacturers. Id.
92
Id. at 84.
93
Walsh, 123 S.Ct. at 1855.
94
Id.
86
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drug costs for the benefit of all of the citizens of Maine.95 Likewise, since a state must
submit their proposal for change or amendment of its Medicaid scheme to the Secretary
of Health and Human Services for approval,96 the government argued that the Maine
statute was either preempted by federal law or invalid due to of the state’s failure to
follow administrative procedures.97
However, in their amicus brief, thirty-eight sovereign states and Puerto Rico
petitioned the Court as one to uphold the court of appeal’s preemption analysis.

98

The

brief argued that granting Medicaid recipients cheaper access to prescription drugs
relieves long term medical costs to the Medicaid system that arise when patients allow
ailments to go untreated simply because those patients cannot afford the pharmaceutical
remedy.99 The brief also encouraged the Court to uphold the negative commerce clause
analysis because the statute did not control prices asked by manufacturers of
pharmaceuticals in their dealings with drug distributors, the statute only regulates the
drugs when they enter the state.100 Likewise, the brief stated that Maine did not regulate
the drugs to benefit state manufacturers or distributors at the expense of out of state
interests.101 Further, the brief urged that no pharmaceutical manufacturer or distributor
was handicapped in their dealings with other states or entities therein.102
In its opinion, the Court limited its analysis to the lifting of the injunction and
declined to resolve any factual disputes.103 The Court also noted that the Maine Rx Plus
Program may still be invalidated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services should
the Secretary decide that the program is in fact an amendment to the state of Maine’s
Medicaid scheme, and thus subject to the Secretary’s review.104 The Court stated that
although the Maine program did not limit benefits to Medicaid recipients only, the Maine
program did not necessarily diminish the benefits that the statute provided to the
95

Brief of Amici Curiae United States, et.al. at 9, PhRMA v. Concannon, 123 S.Ct. 1855 (2003)(No 01188).
96
Id. at 10.
97
Id.
98
Brief of Amici Curiae State of Massachusetts, et.al. at 22, PhRMA v. Concannon, 123 S.Ct. 1855
(2003)(No. 01-188).
99
Id.
100
Id. at 22-24.
101
Id. at 22-29.
102
Id. at 27-29.
103
Walsh, 123 S.Ct. at 1855.
104
Id. at 1866.
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Medicaid population.105

The Court also found that the Maine statute benefited the

Medicaid population by reducing the overall costs of the program through increased
access to the pharmaceuticals during early treatment of conditions, and that prior
authorization substantially reduces the costs associated with the implementation of a
Medicaid program.106
Additionally, the Court held that Maine’s interest in promoting the health of its
uninsured citizens was a valid justification for implementing its prior authorization
requirement. The Court did not require that Maine’s motivation to change Medicaid
benefits relate to the Medicaid Act itself,107 rather, the state must show only that the
Medicaid patients’ medical needs are not adversely affected.108 The Court found that
absent evidence to the contrary; Maine’s prior authorization measures did not negatively
affect the Medicaid patients’ medical needs. 109 Thus, federal law did not preempt the
Maine statute.110 Moreover, the Court found that any impact on the profit margins of the
pharmaceutical manufacturers was merely incidental to the cost savings enjoyed by the
state in serving the medical needs of its underinsured population.111
In addressing the dormant Commerce Clause attack, the Court upheld the First
Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion stating that the Maine statute did not regulate the price
of pharmaceuticals negotiated in the transaction between the manufacturer and the
wholesaler; nor did the Maine program control out of state prices through any in state
pricing scheme.112 Likewise, the Court found that the Maine statute created no disparate
burdens.113

Out-of-state manufacturers would not be able to avoid rebates by

manufacturing within the state, nor would they benefit from in state reimbursement of
local pharmacies;114 therefore, the Court held that the Maine Rx Plus Program did not

105

Id. at 1867.
Id. at 1867-68.
107
Id. at 1867.
108
Id. at 1870.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 1871.
113
Id.
114
Id.
106
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violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.115 Thus, the Court held that the preliminary
injunction was improperly granted by the district court.116
In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer urged the district court to refer the
questions that arose about the effects of the implementation of the Maine Rx Plus
Program to the Secretary of Health and Human Services under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, which allows a court to advantage a government agency’s special expertise
in a given area.117 Likewise, Justices Scalia and Thomas, in separate concurring opinions,
stated that the Secretary of Health and Human Services must address the issues presented
in the case.118 Additionally, Justice Thomas also questioned the standing of the PhRMA
to challenge Spending Clause legislation when the PhRMA did not have a private right of
action.119
However, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, joined also by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, dissented, stating that a state may not generate revenues using prior
authorization mechanisms provided by the federal Medicaid Act and apply these
revenues to purposes “wholly unrelated to its Medicaid program.”120 The dissent feared
misappropriation of such funds to conduct tasks having no relation to Medicare, such as
highway and school construction.121 The dissent also questioned whether any Medicaid
related benefits are actually produced by the Maine program.122 Likewise, the dissenters
questioned whether increased access to pharmaceuticals or prior authorization actually
produces costs savings to the Medicaid program in its entirety.123

IV.

The Best of the Rest.

Many other states have similar statutes providing for state sponsored prior
authorization and drug rebate programs to benefit their own state Medicaid programs.124
115

Id.
Id. at 1871.
117
Id. at 1873.
118
Id at 1874.
119
Id. at 1878.
120
Id. at 1879.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 1880.
123
Id. The Justices feared a rush to judgment absent any evidence before the Court. Id.
124
Holt, supra note 12, at 340-43 .
116

16 of 28

LWC
Michigan’s statute negotiates rebates with pharmaceutical companies by breaking the
prescription drugs into therapeutic categories and using these categories as reference
prices, resulting in equitable post rebate prices.125 Like Maine, the Wisconsin statute
provides that the state Medicaid office is to negotiate rebates with manufacturers and
publish lists of manufacturers who refuse to participate to the public.126
In 2001, Florida enacted a statute127requiring pharmaceutical drug manufacturers
to discount the prices of pharmaceuticals by implementing mandatory10% rebates if the
company desired to place a certain drug on a list of preferred drugs; otherwise, the
manufacturers are a prior authorization process.128

The PhRMA brought an action

against Florida’s Secretary of Medicaid Agency for Health Care Administration in
PhRMA v. Meadows129 alleging that the preferred drug list constituted a “formulary,” as
defined by the federal Medicaid Act;130 and thus, was preempted by federal law.131 In
affirming the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to the state, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the state’s efforts to reduce Medicaid
expenditures, by providing pecuniary incentives for manufacturers to offer rebates, was a
valid exercise of their prior authorization power as authorized by the federal statue.132
Further, the circuit court held that the preferred drug list was not a “formulary” as defined
by the federal statute because the Florida list was not exclusive.133 Any non-preferred
drugs could be prescribed if it was determined, through a prior authorization procedure,
that the drug was medically necessary to treat a given malady.134
Unlike the Maine statute, the Florida statute provides that the proceeds from the
rebates be siphoned into other Medicaid programs promoting public health, instead of recirculating funds into local pharmacies.135 The circuit court followed the first circuit’s
125
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decision in PhRMA v. Concannon136 by recognizing that the Secretary of Health and
Human Services may invalidate the Florida statute if the Secretary determines that
Florida’s statute sufficiently amends Florida’s Medicaid scheme.137

Moreover, the

United States Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari to review Meadows just eight
days after deciding the constitutionality of the Maine statute.138

Thus, PhRMA v.

Walsh139 states the controlling principles governing state statutes instituting the
negotiation of rebates and prior authorization procedures.
Throughout the world, other governments successfully negotiate reduced prices
with the pharmaceutical industry. In the United Kingdom, the Department of Health and
Social Security (DHSS) negotiates maximum profit margins with all pharmaceutical
companies that sell their products in the country.140 In addition to controlling research
and development budgets, the British system negotiates limits on advertising.141 The
DHSS also establishes a list of drugs for which the government will not reimburse the
institutions within their wholly funded government health care system.142 Additionally,
the DHSS provides a budget plan for doctors within the system that rewards a physician
with surplus funds when that doctor efficiently and effectively prescribes available
alternative generic drugs.143
In France and Germany, the government also reimburses all state owned facilities
for covered pharmaceutical drugs by implementing a single buyer system.144 In France, a
government program determines which drugs are covered and the amount that the
government will reimburse.145 However, the French government does not hold patients
or doctors responsible for the quantity or value of the medicines prescribed.146 Unlike
France, the German government decides for which drugs the participating health care
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organizations will not be reimbursed.147 Although it does not set prices for the drugs, the
German government establishes a reference price by therapeutic category, in addition to
establishing a maximum price that the government will reimburse for a certain drug.148
The government audits physicians to ascertain an individual physician’s ability to find
medically equivalent generics, in addition to the physician’s overall efficiency.149
German citizens must also pay the difference between the reference price and the actual
price they pay for their prescription.150
The Canadian model institutes a Patented Medicine Prices Review Board
(PMPRB) that regulates the level of exclusivity a patent enjoys on the prescription drug
market.151 The PMPRB grants producers of generic drugs the opportunity to reach the
market before the patent of a certain drug expires by requiring generic manufacturers to
pay a type of royalty to the company that owns the patent.152

The PMPRB also

determines the fair return on a given investment that the pharmaceutical company makes
and sets prices accordingly, thus, necessarily limiting marketing and advertising
budgets.153 The PMPRB also wields significant bargaining power in its negotiations with
pharmaceutical companies. 154 This bargaining power arises from the PMPRB’s ability to
invalidate patents of pharmaceutical companies that refuse to negotiate with the
government.155

V.

The Medicare Prescription Drug, Modernization and Improvement Act
of 2003.

On December 8, 2003, the 108th Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Modernization and Improvement Act of 2003 (the “Act”).156 The Act established a tax
147
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deduction for individuals who invest in savings accounts to provide for any future
inadequacy or unavailability of health insurance, instituted a discount prescription drug
program for Medicare recipients, and constructed barbed wire hoops for importers and reimporters of pharmaceutical drugs to jump through if they desire to import
pharmaceuticals from Canada.157 Congress also asked the American people to engage in
a public debate to consider: 1) what health care services coverage they desire; 2) the
extent of health coverage they desire; and 3) by what means they are willing to pay for
coverage.158
The prescription drug program will be available as an additional policy to Medicare
beneficiaries, or as a supplement to existing private health plans for Medicare-aged
individuals.159 However, until the Act goes into full effect in 2006, prescription drug
cards can be purchased from participating manufacturers and authorized agencies to
access discounted prices on brand name and pharmaceutical drugs.160 The cards will also
provide small allowances to very low-income seniors.161
Under the Act, individuals covered under Medicare, who spend more than $810 per
year on prescription drugs, benefit from minor discounts.162 Individuals paying between
$2,250 and $5,100 per year on prescriptions drugs may save up to $1,080 under the
sticker price.163 Although they enjoy the greatest cost advantage, those whose yearly
prescription drug dole costs more than $5,100 must pay at least $4,020 a year to take
advantage of any cost savings.164 Also, seniors who do not join the drug benefit program
between November 15, 2005 and May 15, 2006, but still wish to join the program, must
pay a penalty fee of a 1% increase of their annual premium for every month they delay
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joining.165 The penalty fee attaches to all yearly premiums throughout the life of the
Medicare beneficiary.166
The Act’s governance of the importation of drugs from Canada arguably has the
greatest impact on the cost of available pharmaceuticals.167 The Act subjects pharmacists
and wholesalers to a number of safeguards that must be met before the Secretary of
Health and Human Services may choose whether or not to certify a company to import
pharmaceuticals from Canada.168 The Act authorizes the Secretary to certify companies
to import pharmaceuticals from Canada only, thereby implying that otherwise qualified
pharmaceuticals from other countries would still remain a violation of the FDCA.169
In order to be considered by the Secretary for authorization to import
pharmaceuticals from Canada, a company seeking to import pharmaceuticals must
ultimately subject its plight to the complete discretion of the Secretary.170 The company
must provide information to the Secretary with regard to the quantity, quality, and batch
history of the drug.171 Similarly, the information provided to the Secretary must include
similar documentation from the foreign seller of the pharmaceutical drug.172 In the case
of re-importation, the foreign company exporting the drug back into the United States
must re-verify the quality173 and quantity of a drug, as well as include scientific
documentation to that effect.174
The importer or manufacturer must comply with all labeling and branding
requirements under the FDCA.175 The importer or manufacturer importing the drugs
must also include all laboratory test records and other documentation verifying the
identity and quality of the pharmaceuticals.176 Moreover, if the importer is the entity
conducting the laboratory tests, the importer must acquire FDCA compliant labels from
165
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the manufacturer after verifying the quality of the drug.177 Further, all foreign entities
that wish to act as middlemen in the importation process described under the Act must
register with the Secretary of Health and Human Services.178 If any impropriety is
discovered at any time, the Secretary may immediately suspend importation operation
until the Secretary determines that the process is once again safe for the public.179
However, in direct contradiction of its intent to protect the public from the
potential harms of imported drugs,180 Congress granted the Secretary the authority to
selectively enforce violations of the FDCA by granting specific waivers to individuals
importing pharmaceuticals.181

The Act provides that the Secretary must focus on

prosecution of cases in which the drugs being imported pose a “significant threat to
public health.”182 The Act commands the Secretary to overlook situations in which
importation is clearly for personal use, and where the imported drug does not “appear to
present an unreasonable risk to the individual.”183
Individuals who are granted an express waiver to violate the Act, and who wish to
import pharmaceuticals, must: 1) verify that their purchase is for personal use for no
more than 90 days; 2) have a valid prescription; 3) import the drug from a seller
registered with the Secretary; and 4) verify that the drug was manufactured in compliance
with the FDCA.184 At its own discretion, the Secretary may subject the waiver process to
any and all other safeguards, in excess of those expressly mandated by the Act, if the
Secretary feels such waivers are necessary to ensure the public safety.185 Last, the
Secretary can decide not to implement the waiver program at all, or do so only
selectively.186

VI.

The Cautionary Tale and A Response.
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Generally, the pharmaceutical industry opposes any form of price controls based
largely on the valid arguments asserted by other free market industries.187
Pharmaceutical companies believe that they should be free to make as much money as the
market will bear.188 However, the pharmaceutical industry is not subject to the same
level of market restraint as that of other free market industry.189 Oftentimes no viable
alternative products exist for individuals suffering from a variety of maladies, thus, those
individuals are unable to seek equivalent treatment elsewhere.190 Further, insurance
companies and government agencies that are able to negotiate lower prices with the
pharmaceutical industry do so without the ability to walk away from the table because of
this lack of viable treatment alternatives.191
Moreover, because illnesses affect all strata of social hierarchy, demand is consistent
in all sectors.192 However, the ability to pay is not static.193 These commodities are often
necessary to sustain life and cannot be foregone by those who cannot afford them without
jeopardizing one’s own health and well-being.194

Therefore, the pharmaceutical

companies exist in a vacuum devoid of typical market restraints.
In addition, pharmaceutical companies warn that controls on prices will decrease the
monetary incentive for research and development.195 Likewise, drug companies fear that
price control will decrease the amount of money actually available for research and
development.196 However, as the pharmaceutical industry enjoys increasingly larger
profit margins, the companies have not correspondingly increased research and
development investments.197 Rather, the federal government provides the pharmaceutical
industry with a substantial amount of the research and development funds used by
pharmaceutical companies in developing new drugs.198 The pharmaceutical industry has
also increased advertising spending to unprecedented levels, while research and
187
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development spending remains relatively stagnant.199 Additionally, drug companies fix
prices based on self-interested factors.200
Because the pharmaceutical industry has decided to promote individual drugs as a
marketing strategy, instead of increasing spending on research and development to bring
a greater variety of drugs to the market, a minimal level of price control would force the
drug companies to increase development volume in order to increase profits. Some level
of price control forces a mutually beneficial relationship between the pharmaceutical
industry’s need to prosper financially, and society’s need to prosper physically. Last,
price control mechanisms introduce certain barriers of market restraint that are currently
absent from the pharmaceutical market in the United States.
So what to do now? The Medicare Act of 2003 and the plight of companies like
RxDepot have constrained the ability of private industry to participate in accessing lower
prices on prescription drugs in other markets.201 Canada is the only foreign market from
which companies could possibly obtain express authorization from the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to import pharmaceuticals under the Act if they are seeking
to import drugs legally.202 However, the Canadian government fears its own citizens will
experience a shortage of pharmaceuticals if importers buy pharmaceuticals for export.203
In a corresponding act of chivalry, several drug companies are attempting to curtail the
amount of drugs exported to Canada so that Americans cannot access lower prices.204
Perhaps a workable price control method involves the Maine model.205 Like the
several other states that have adopted similar statutes,206 Maine exercised its bargaining
power as an entity to provide for the pharmaceutical needs of the state’s Medicaid
population. Additionally, Maine also provides for the needs of its under-insured nonMedicaid population as well. By incorporating the Maine type of broad coverage with
certain price referencing mechanisms, such as those instituted in the United Kingdom and
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Michigan that break pharmaceuticals down into therapeutic categories, state legislatures
could increase their bargaining power to negotiate lower prices on pharmaceuticals to
meet the needs of their state’s population.
If states can effectively negotiate lower prices, the pharmaceutical industry will be
forced to negotiate lower prices with the private insurance sector as well. As these
negotiated prescription drug prices decrease the cost to the consumer, and approach the
Canadian prices, the danger to the public arising from importation and re- importation will
likewise decrease due to the decreased consumer incentive to access foreign markets.
The pharmaceutical industry will be forced to divert monies from advertising and
marketing in order to generate a greater number of products and offset the “losses”
suffered from decreasing profit margins.

As the pharmaceutical companies rush to

develop a greater variety of products, the flurry of development will allow the
pharmaceutical industry to maintain its wealthy status among the nation’s health care
industries and will benefit the American people as new cures and treatments become
available.
Although the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Maine statute, the
Court also indicated that the final decision would rest with the Secretary of Health and
Human Services.207 This indication, in addition to Congress’ express and exclusive
authorization to the Secretary to certify companies to import drugs from Canada,208
indicates that the Secretary serves as the ultimate arbiter of pharmaceutical prices in the
United States.

Although the Secretary has historically refused to approve such

importation,209 the sole responsibility for the fate of pharmaceutical prices in the United
States nevertheless lies with the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Therefore, the
opportunity to achieve the correlated benefit of an increased variety of cures and
treatments lies with the Secretary as well as pharmaceutical companies would scramble to
maintain profit levels through research and development, instead of single product
advertising.
The Secretary must find and recommend that the new state Medicaid initiatives are
valid amendments to individual states’ Medicaid programs. Likewise, the Secretary must
207
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authorize private industry companies that are in compliance with the terms of the
Medicare Act of 2003 to begin re-importation of pharmaceuticals from Canada. By
exposing the United States pharmaceutical market to entities that have the bargaining
power to negotiate fair prices for their customers or constituents, the prescription drug
industry will finally be subjected to a form of market constraint that is vital to a healthy
free market.210
The FDA and Congress’ aggressive regulation of pharmacists and wholesalers who
import pharmaceuticals211 (hereafter “pharmaceutical importers” or “importers”) in the
name of public safety is misplaced. In fact, the statute that purports to regulate the
importation of pharmaceutical drugs alters the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA)212 and grants the Secretary of Health and Human Services the power to
implement an importation program only if such a program would “pose no additional risk
to the public’s health and safety”.213 The statute also extends to the executive branch the
ability to waive enforcement of the law on individuals who import pharmaceuticals solely
for personal use.214 The effect of the statute clearly indicates that the only safeguarding
the statute will do is to refortify the dam that prevents the pharmaceutical industry’s
profit margin from spilling into the valley of market restraint, where others attempting to
provide quality drugs at quality prices lie in wait.
Through the Act, Congress mandates the Secretary to weigh the burdens and benefits
of implementing pharmaceutical cost reducing procedures.215

The benefits of

pharmaceutical price reduction have traditionally been discussed in terms of increasing
access to individual consumers.216 However, providing basic access to individuals cannot
be considered a benefit if the resulting access cripples individuals’ ability to afford their
daily bread,217 let alone the ability to access the other pecuniary privileges and liberties
that being a citizen of the United States entails.

Therefore, the Secretary must

acknowledge the preceding utility analysis to open the United States pharmaceutical
210
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market to the world; thereby providing citizens meaningful access to the prescription
drugs that fuel American prosperity and ingenuity.

VII.

Conclusion.

The citizens of the United States are suffering at the hands of the pharmaceutical
industry’s profiteering machinery.218 Congress acknowledges that, despite the overall
wealth of the United States, all those who desire health care coverage cannot access
health care coverage.219 Likewise, Congress stated that: “Innovations in health care
access, coverage, and quality of care, including the use of technology, have often come
from the States, local communities, and private sector organization, but more creative
policies could tap this potential.”220
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003221
and the decision in RxDepot222 prevent private industry from obtaining unfettered access
to the price control mechanisms in foreign countries that could serve as one potential cost
reduction mechanism.

Similarly, athough the Supreme Court has upheld the

constitutionality of state statutes promoting rebate negotiation and prior authorization
procedures,223 the ultimate decision on both the importation issue and the validity of state
Medicaid amendments lies with the Secretary of Health and Human Services.

All

conjecture concerning the institution of price control mechanisms in the United States 224
ended with the enactment of the Medicare Act of 2003.
Now is truly the “last call” for price control measures in the United States, and the
only “bartender” left to effectively implement such measures is the Secretary of Health
and Human Services, a department of the executive branch. The legislative and judicial
218
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branches have both deferred their questions to the executive branch.225 Therefore, the
Secretary must exercise both its authority and ability to take the essential steps to subject
the pharmaceutical industry to the restraints of a true free market. The only alternative is
to continue the suffering of individuals who hemorrhage substantial amounts of money to
the most profitable industry in the United States.226
As attorney Fred Stoops aptly stated: “The only real safety issue in this case is the
safety of the obscene profits of the pharmaceutical companies.”227
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